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CASE NOTES 147
In the case under discussion the Court distinguished for the first tiic
between solicitation by drummers and solicitation by a branch office. The
decision acknowledges the tax immunity where drummers are employed
but points out that the advantages gained by employing a local branch
office make transactions consummated by the use of such a branch office
local in nature. The Supreme Court decision was based on logic and com-
mon sense for it cited no supporting cases. By maintaining a branch office,
the Massachusetts corporation intended to keep close to the Illinois trade.
The trade might think the seller too remote to transact business if solicitors
were the sole means of contact between the vendor and the vendees. The
local office also affords service to machines after they are in the consumers'
hands and stands ready to offer engineering and technical advice. After
the foreign corporation has gained the confidence of its customers through
its local operations and has received the protection of the state, there is no
reason why it should not bear the burden of a local business.
Norton Company v. Department of Revenue of the State of Illinois
stands as a new development in the application of the Dilworth case inas-
much as it upholds a tax on solicitation through a branch office. The case
also exemplifies three views as to what constitutes interstate commerce.
The majority opinion holds the middle ground. The conservative view is
expressed in Reed's dissent that only proceeds from direct sales should be
taxed and the liberal view in Justice Clark's dissent which extended the
reasoning of the majority of the Court to apply to all types of transactions
carried on by the Norton Company. It would seem that despite mechani-
cal or artificial distinctions sometimes made to arrive at decisions as to the
validity or invalidity of particular taxes, the decisions are predicated on
practical judgment as to the likelihood of the tax being used to place inter-
state commerce at a competitive disadvantage.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-DENIAL OF EQUITABLE ENFORCE-
MENT OF FOREIGN ALIMONY DECREE
Plaintiff recovered a New York decree for divorce and alimony pay-
able in installments, and sought to enforce it in Illinois. While the plaintiff
was allowed to set up the past due installments as a foreign judgment and
recover same as a debt, it was held that equitable relief, by way of civil
contempt for failure to pay future alimony installments, was properly
denied. Tailby v. Tailby, 342 I11. App. 664, 97 N.E. 2d 6i ( 3d Dist., 1951)
The Tailby decision is the third case to be decided in Illinois as to
whether equity will enforce a foreign alimony decree. The first was Rule
141 (1889); Asher v. Texas, 128 U.S. 129 (1888); Carson v. Maryland, 1zo U.S. 5o2
(1887). Contra: Re Rudolph, z Fed. 65 (C.C. Nev., 188o); Dunston v. City of Norfolk.
177 Va. 689, 15 S.E. zd 86 (1941); Collier v. Burgin, 13o N.C. 632, 41 S.E. 874 (1902).
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v. Rule' wherein plaintiff sought to enforce her Nevada decree for
periodic alimony. The authorities being divided on the question and it
being one of first impression in Illinois, the court felt free to choose the
rule more in accord with principles of equity and justice and granted the
plaintiff equitable relief. In 1949 the Illinois Supreme Court considered
Clubb v. Clubb.- Plaintiff there sought to have her English decree for di-
vorce and alimony established and enforced by equitable means in Illinois.
The court held that the full faith and credit clause applied only to judg-
inents of sister states and not to judgments of foreign countries, and that
the principle of comity did not require that the English decree be recog-
nized. The court further said that "jurisdiction of courts of equity to
determine divorce cases and all matters relating thereto is conferred only
by statute .... ,, Because the Illinois divorce statute does not provide for
equitable relief in these instances, 4 such remedies are not available.
The decision in the Tailby case summarily sidestepped Rule v. Rule,
although the latter was directly in point, and based its holding on the
statement in the Clubb case that divorce proceedings and "all matters
relating thereto" are purely statutory. The authorities for the above state-
ment cited in the Clubb case are three decisions of the Illinois Supreme
Court: Arandt v. Arandt,5 Smith v. Smith,6 and Smith v. Johnson.' Smith
v. Johnson, the first case to consider specifically the question of the extent
of equitable jurisdiction in divorce matters, merely said that divorce pro-
ceedings are statutory; there was no mention of the fact that "all matters
relating thereto" are also limited by statute. The court, in Smith v. Smith,
added the phrase "all matters relating thereto" which was subsequently
included in the Arandt and Clubb cases. It is submitted that this additional
phrase was erroneous. In Smith v. Johnson, the parties and the court con-
ceded that equity would have general jurisdiction, apart from the statute,
in matters concerning the welfare of children. If the court has this general
equity power, the additional phrase in Smith v. Smith seems wrong, espe-
cially as Smith v. Johnson was cited as authority. Furthermore, other
Illinois Supreme Court decisions, while reiterating the general rule and
citing Smith v. Smith as authority, were confined to the sole proposition
that jurisdiction in divorce suits is purely statutory. They did not state
rhat the court has no equity jurisdiction over "all matters relating there-
' 313 111. App. io8, 39 N.E. zd 379 (zd Dist., 1942).
2402 111. 39o , 84 N.E. 2d 366 (1949).
a 402 Ill. 390, 400, 84 N.E. 2d 366, 371 (949). Italics by the writer.
4 Ill. Rev. Star. (1949), c. 40.
5 399 Ill. 490, 78 N.E. 2d 272 (1948).
6 334 111.370, 166 N.E. 85 (1929).
7 321111. 134, 151 N.E. 550 (t926).
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to. "" It appears, then, that the statement that all matters relating to divorce
are limited by statute, is merely dictum. What is then left is the rule that
divorce proceedings alone are purely statutory.
However, this rule is not applicable in the Tailby case. It seems to be
self-evident that a suit on a foreign alimony decree is not a suit for di-
vorce although it may be a "matter relating thereto." The rights of the
parties and the merits of the case have already been adjudicated under the
statutes of the divorcing court, and the successful party is merely seeking
the enforcement of his or her rights. Why, then, should the court be con-
cerned with the provisions of its own domestic divorce statute? The
divorce statute of the forum has been held not to be applicable to a suit
on a foreign alimony decree, as such a proceeding is not a suit for divorce.0
Under the doctrine of Williams v. North Carolina,'° the divorce of one
state must be given full faith and credit by all other states, and only the
jurisdiction of the divorce court may be collaterally attacked. Further-
more, the Tailby case is unique in its solution of the problem as neither
the Rule case nor the cases from other states have concerned themselves
with the question of whether the equity court has general jurisdiction over
matters relating to divorce."
The cases in other states concerning the question of equitable relief for
foreign alimony decrees fall under three theories-two denying and one
granting relief. Equitable relief is denied on one hand, because there is
an adequate remedy at law permitting recovery of the past due alinlony
installments, -12 or on the other hand, because the "full faith and credit
clause" has no application to the form of remedies to be afforded to
foreign judgments.18
Those cases which grant equitable relief base their decisions on the fact
that alimony is more than a debt-its basis is the duty of the husband to
support his wife. The state being an interested party, the courts, in fur-
therance of public policy, will grant enforcement of this duty by the ex-
8 Marcy v. Marcy, 4oo 111. 152, 79 N.E. 2d 207 (948); Ward v. Sampson, 395 Ill. 353,
7o N.E. zd 324 (1946); McFarlin v. McFarlin, 384 Ill. 428, 51 N.E. 2d 520 (943);
Johnson v. Johnson, 381 I!. 362, 45 N.E. 2d 6z 5 (1942); Anderson v. Anderson, 380 II.
435, 44 N.E. ad 54 (1942).
9 Mayer v. Mayer, 154 Mich. 386, 117 N.W. 89o (19o8); Wood v. Wood, 7 N.Y.
Misc. 579, z8 N.Y. Supp. 154 (C.P., 1894).
10 325 U.S. z,6 (1945).
11 Consult cases collected in notes 12, 13 and 14, infra.
12 Worsley v. Worsley, 76 F. ad 815 (App. D.C., 1935), cert. denied 294 U.S. 725
(1935); Lynde v Lynde, 16z N.Y. 405, 56 N.E. 979 (19oo), aff'd 181 U.S. 183 (1901);
Weidman v. Weidman, 274 Mass. 118, 174 N.E. 2o6 (1931); Mayer v. Mayer, 154 Mich.
386, 117 N.W. 89o (19o8); Kossower v. Kossower, 142 Atl. 30 (N.J., 1928).
i8 Bullock v. Bullock. 52 N.J. Eq. 561, 3o Ati. 676 (9894).
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traordinary methods of equity.1 4 This theory which underlies the Rule
decision is supported by the numerical weight of authority and the trend
of recent cases.
The Tailby case appears to be on thin ground, while the Ru!e case is the
better reasoned and the more modern view. Although the judge in the
Tailby case was not bound to follow the view of the Second District
in the Rule case,1'- the reasoning in Rule v. Rule should have been given
more than a mere passing reference. With the conflict in the appellate
court level between the Rule and Tailby decisions, a final determination 1)
the Illinois Supreme Court is most desirable. Affirmance of the theory of
Ritle v. Rule would seem preferable.
LABOR LAIJ'-INSULTING LANGUAGE ON THE
PICKET LINE
Defendant while acting as a picket was arrested for singing a song
which referred to -workers who refused to respect the picket lines as
"scahs" and "whores." Her defense was predicated on her constitutional
right of free speech. The Supreme Court of Virginia in upholding her
conviction declared constitutional a unique statute' making it a crime to
use insulting language which induces one to refrain from working.
McWhorter v. Covmion-wealtb, 191 Va. 857, 63 S.E. 2d 20 (195!).
Some thirty-three states have enacted statutes which protect the right to
work. - Constitutional attacks on these statutes predicated upon equal pro-
14 Bruton v. Tearle, 7 Cal. 2d 48, 59 P. 2d 953 (1936); Creager v. Superior Ct.,
i6 Cal. App. 280, 14 P. 2d 552 (1932); German v. German, 122 Conn. 155, 188 At].
49 (1936); Ostrander v. Ostrander, 19o Minn. 547, 252 N.W. 449 (1934); Fanchier v.
Gammill, 148 Miss. 723, 114 So. 813 (1927); Cousineau v. Cousineau, 155 Ore. t84,
61 P. 2d 897 (1936); Johnson v. Johnson, t96 S.C. 474, 13 S.E. 2d 593 (94); Shibley v.
Shiblev, 181 Wash. i66, 42 P. 2d 446 (1935). For a further discussion of this problem
and other cases falling under notes 12, 13 and 14, consult, Decree for alimony rendered
in another state or foreign country as subject to enforcement by equitable remedies
or by contempt proceedings, 97 A.L.R. 1197 (1935); io9 A.L.R. 652 (1937).
15 Decisions of one Illinois Appellate Court are not binding upon another. Hughes
v. Bandy, 336 II1. App. 472, 84 N.E. zd 664 (1949), aff'd 404 II. 74, 87 N.E. 2d 855
(1949).
1 "It shall be unlawful for any person singly or in concert with others to interfere
or attempt to interfere with another in the exercise of his right to work or enter upon
the performance of any lawful vocation, by the use of force, threats of violence
or intimidation, or by the use of insulting or threatening language directed towards
such person to induce or attempt to induce him to quit his employment." Va. Code
(1950) c. 229, § 4o-64.
2States not having such statutes are: Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas. Kentucky, Louisiana, AMaiyland, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming. Interfering with another's right to
work was not indictable at common law. State v. McGee, 8o Conn. 614, 69 Ad. io59
(1o8).
